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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,

;

Plaintiff-Respondent, i
vs.

!i

DANIEL VIJIL,

;

Case No. 20111

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE QF THE CASE
This case deals with the jurisdiction of the Seventh
Judicial District Court for San Juan County over the defendant, a
member of the Navajo Indian Tribe residing on the Navajo
Reservation, in an action to recover child support monies
expended by the State of Utah for the benefit of the defendant's
children who do not reside on the reservation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan
County, State of Utah denied a Motion to Vacate a Judgment which
had previously been entered against the defendant on the ground
that membership in the tribe and residing on the reservation did
not, as a matter of law, deprive the court of jurisdiction.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent/ State of Utah, respectfully asks that the
ruling of the Seventh District Court for San Juan County be
affirmed and that the previously entered judgment against the
appellant be found valid and enforceable.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent respectfully submits the following Statement
of the Facts inasmuch as the Statement of the Facts in
Appellant's brief did not contain page references to the record
and also contained facts which are not supported by the record
and which possibly were not presented to the lower court.
Appellant, Daniel Vijil (hereinafter "Mr. Vijil"), is
an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe (R. 12). He is a resident
of Aneth, Utah within the exterior boundaries of the Navajo
Reservation (R. 14). Mr. Vijil is the father of Frederick,
Orlando, and Azalea Vijil (hereinafter "the dependent children"),
all of whom are enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe (R. 12).
From the period of time from November 1, 1983 to December 31,
1983, the State of Utah expended $820.00 for the benefit of the
dependent children.
On or about December 13, 1983, a Notice of Support Debt
was sent to Mr. Vijil from the Utah Department of Social Services
pursuant to the Public Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. §
78-45b-5 (1977) (R. 1 ) . Mr. Vijil failed to attend an informal
conference or request a formal hearing as required by the Notice
(R. 14). On March 6, 1984, an award for $724.00 was entered
against Mr. Vijil representing his child support obligation (R.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAVAJO TRIBE DID NOT
AUTOMATICALLY DEPRIVE THE STATE DISTRICT COURT OF
JURISDICTION OVER AN ACTION TO RECOVER CHILD
SUPPORT SINCE TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP IS MERELY ONE
FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER
STATE ACTION WOULD INFRINGE ON THE RIGHT OF
RESERVATION INDIANS TO MAKE THEIR OWN LAWS AMI
GOVERNED BY THEM.
«•;

>T

zr

(

\n , , i " ,

<*

w J > ^ lilt: iiv.

U v j u i h o l

-he grounos -.hat >:.* vu

support

a memoes

and resicif
t h a t

.^t

judgn.c-i *

vj,

:

* c L v.

i.isui

i

H

v *•

WQ: id; * r u c a t m c cne

^uestioi

turns
parties
o c c u r r e d ^:. <

allegt
ne i e s e r v a t i o

cont.
infrin--

: c&ci vaLxuil
^

i est,: vat J on lr : * o

laws and be r u l e d by them.

Thus, uasec

:i*-aci:*j

.».'.

, nr>

W^ 1 1 !

d

men
I in ,ri"

i ii 'f

oi

P

the lower court as reflected in the record, the court could not
rule that these two factors alone would prevent state court
jurisdiction.
As pointed out in the Appellantfs brief. Congress has
established guidelines for the assumption of civil jurisdiction
by states.

25 U.S.C. § 1322 (a) provides in part:

The consent of the United States is
hereby given to any State not having
jurisdiction over civil causes of action
between Indians or to which Indians are
parties which arise in the areas of Indian
country situated within such State to assume,
with the consent of the tribe occupying the
particular Indian country or part thereof
which would be affected by such assumption,
such measure of jurisdiction over any or all
such civil causes of action arising within
£.uch Indian country or any part thereof as
may be determined by such State to the same
extent that such State has jurisdiction over
other civil causes of action...
(Emphasis added.)

Consent under this statute could confer upon a

state the sole jurisdiction over civil causes of action within
the state as if the reservation did not exist.

While the Navajo

tribe has not consented to the assumption of such civil
jurisdiction, it is important to note that Congress was not
attempting to deny states the right to jurisdiction for wrongs
occurring off the reservation and within the state.

Thus there

are some situations in which state courts exercise jurisdiction
over members of an Indian tribe.
The matter before this court involves an Indian's
obligation to support his dependent children.

While the record

is silent on the point, Appellant's brief notes that Mr. Vijil's
children were residing off the reservation in the state of Utah

-4-

til

tlie Lime t h e y r e c e i v e d p u b l i c i s s i s t a n c r

4).

in l i c j n t oi

m)i*i::! i | ' i « i

" -.

fact,

•

c-* -:. -^

> * -ot

r» *.

-tvt , the decisit

c.n be affirmed win-nit -..-- tn.,,

.elusion w u n
h<a

.. - .
Cdnnut" automatical! ; : *

i

,<eraD- : -: i.jr N G V ^

s u b 3 e c t t: o t •i** i u r 1 -.:*-:•':
iiH.'itl'i

„t

i"'

withih itie Stale u.
court

,

' A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief

iiuciiu'ii.

court

:I L.-

.

I n -...oersmt

1
' * .:-....

C o u r t s wt* ,

.

auditionai

,.u

r^^nd^x*

t a c t s before

t (<-'• - ^ ^

which have lien n .ask
child support w a t t t . i
Some c o u r t s l o o k Lc

. - ^.Kx i ,
i-

«.xten:

lie d ^ i u d C i i nney n a v e
'

rij-in1-

- :

:3M:!..

contacts wt......

facto

* -iie

.".: .

The case

v-

*.ne
ng

*. :etner the state. / u: t .ssuja^t.wi ..f

: . ^.,. . i^JLeX* Pi^nmond v. Flammonc,

Mont.

wire n v m c

i

*.;: r .

.nitiated t m

Fr

^ceeainq wni^n

: . ested the wuiiu'
.-J nusban^ w..
Supreme ^L r*

oxu^u

eservation.

Tut Kontc\.

^ b u ; t *- defendant . ^ ^ rathe*1, • -^

anv * - . *
Montai la.

Since the wile was residing in Luino:; ( .a ^-.n L^.

initiated the UKESA proceeding from tntit, uiic couii uuieu uiiat

the acts of nonsupport had not occurred in Montana, but rather in
California.

Had the wife and children resided in Montana, the

decision may have been different.
In the present case, there were no representations
which would warrant a finding that Mr. Vijil did not have
contacts, even significant or substantial contacts, with the
State of Utah.

Indeed, as the court concluded, the fact that Mr.

Vijil1s children received public assistance from the State of
Utah would seem to indicate at least some contact with the State.
Some courts have taken the approach that was identified
in the case of Williams v. Leer 358 U.S. 217 (1959).

In

discussing the appropriateness of state action, the Supreme Court
concluded that "the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."

Id* at 220.

The Williams v. Lee approach was applied by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in the case of Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69,
499 P.2d 691 (1972), a case in which the court considered the
question of whether the state courts had jurisdiction in a URESA
action initiated by a wife in Wisconsin against her husband, a
Zuni Indian residing on the Zuni Indian Reservation.

In

upholding the state court's jurisdiction, the court stated:
It is our view that the application
of the Act, supra, to this appellant in no way
interferes with the internal self-government
of the Zuni Tribe, nor does it contravene any
express federal grant or reservation.... No
citation is needed to support the moral and
social obligation of a parent to support his
children.
Xd. at 693.
-6-

Another New Mexico case, State Securities, Inc. v.
Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973), discusses the
Williams v. Lee approach, surveys a number of cases and other
authorities, and concludes:
We believe a reasonable summary of
the preceding law, especially as it applies
to New Mexico, may be found in Ransom and
Gilstrap, Indians - Civil Jurisdiction in New
Mexico - State, Federal and Tribal Courts, 1
N.M. Law Rev. 196 (1971). In this scholarly
article the authors conclude: "It may be,
then, that exclusive Indian jurisdiction
exists when an action involves a proprietary
interest in Indian land; or when an Indian
sues another Indian on a claim for relief
recognized only by tribal custom or law; or,
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment argument,
when an Indian is suing or being sued by
another Indian or non-Indian over an
occurrence or transaction arising in Indian
country about which the Tribe does, or
foreseeably will, in the exercise of its
police power, assume sovereign control
through tribal law, court, or executive
action.n
Id. at 789.
As shown above, there are situations which will warrant
state court jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes residing
on the reservation.

It is unnecessary to state anything more in

light of the lower court's ruling.

The lower court's ruling must

be affirmed since the defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment
failed to state adequate grounds to support the motion.

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE COURT
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AUTOMATICALLY DEPRIVED
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER AN ENROLLED
MEMBER OF A TRIBE RESIDING ON A RESERVATION
SINCE SUFFICIENT OFF-RESERVATION CONTACTS
WILL SUBJECT A TRIBAL MEMBER TO STATE COURT
JURISDICTION.

-7-

Where a state court has properly established subject
matter jurisdiction over an action involving an Indian residing
on a reservation on the basis of off-reservation contactsf
personal jurisdiction follows as a result of the off-reservation
contacts of the Indian.

The same contacts leading to the

subject-matter jurisdiction are sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction.
This principle has been recognized in many situations.
In State Securities, Inc. v. Andersonf supraf where the Indian
defendant incurred contractual obligations off the reservation
not only was the court granted personal jurisdiction the court
also held that state court process could be served on Indians
while they are within the boundaries of the reservation.
This concept is emphasized in the case of LeClair v.
Powers, 632 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1981), a case in which the court,
after concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a
divorce proceeding involving an Indian residing on a reservation,
stated:
Once the district court has assumed
jurisdiction over the subject matter and
process has been properly served, the
defendant cannot throw up a shield around
herself by claiming that the state process
server cannot pierce the exterior boundaries
of an Indian reservation and serve civil
process therein.
632 P.2d at 374 (quoting from the case of Bad Horse v. Bad Horse,
163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 847
(1974), overruled on another issue 636 P.2d 266 (1981)).
The determining factor in establishing personal
jurisdiction over an Indian residing on the reservation is the
-8-

existence of subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding.

If

the subject matter jurisdiction is established/ the personal
jurisdiction will follow.

Although an Indian reservation is in

many ways considered separate from the state within whose
boundaries it exists, there is a closer relationship between
residents of the reservation and the state than exists between
citizens of two states.

Long-arm statutes have not been and

should not be required in order to reach the reservation's
inhabitants if subject matter jurisdiction in the state court has
been established.

The above-cited cases confirm the closeness of

the reservation to the state since state process servers were
allowed to function within the reservation.
Once again, the Seventh Judicial District Court
correctly held that the fact that the defendant was a member of
the Navajo tribe and resided on the reservation did not preclude
the state court from having personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.

Since subject matter jurisdiction is a possibility in

cases involving a member of the Navajo tribe residing on the
reservation, it must follow that personal jurisdiction is also a
possibility.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Seventh Judicial
District Court's ruling which stated that Mr. Vijil's tribal
membership and reservation residency were not adequate grounds
for vacating a judgment against Mr. Vijil for child support.

The

facts available to the court, as reflected by the record, were
limited to the fact that Mr. Vijil was a registered member of the
Navajo tribe and that he resided on the Navajo reservation.
-9-

State courts have been found to have subject matter
jurisdiction over Indians residing on a reservation in matters
involving significant off-reservation contacts and/or in matters
where the state action would not interfere with the Indian's
rights to make their own laws and be governed by them.

The lower

court did not have sufficient information available to make a
finding that Mr* Vijil did not have off-reservation contacts.
The fact that his children received public assistance from the
State of Utah would tend to show that there were such offreservation contacts.

Some courts have held that child support

enforcement proceedings do not interfere with an Indian tribe1s
right to make its own laws and govern its people.
Personal jurisdiction over Mr. Vijil would exist if the
lower court had subject matter jurisdiction over this
controversy.

The reservation cannot shield an Indian from the

process of a state court that has subject matter jurisdiction.
The lower court correctly held that the grounds
presented by Mr. Vijil in support of his motion to vacate the
judgment of the state court were insufficient to establish that
the state court lacked jurisdiction.
Respondent prays that the ruling of the lower court be
affirmed.

-10-

Respectfully submitted this

day of December,

1984.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

MARK E. WAINWRIGHT
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SAN JUAN
STATE_OF_UJAH

/ - ^ r''.

ii^

COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
RULING ON MOTION
TO VACATE JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DANIEL S. VIJIL,
Defendant.

Abstract No. 255-2

In this case the defendant has moved the Court
to Vacate the Judgment heretofore docketed against

this

defendant and does so on the alleged ground that the State
did not have jurisdiction

over the subject matter of this

action and, further, that they had no jurisdiction

over his

person.
The Court has examined the Affidavit

submitted,

with the Motion and finds that no ground is stated upon which
the Court could grant the Motion.
The Court cannot automatically

rule that no member

of the Navajo tribe is subject to the jurisdiction

of the

Courts of the State of Utah merely because of membership in
the tribe and, further, the Court cannot rule as a matter of
law that the,fact that a defendant w h o is a member of the
tribe resides on the reservation deprives the courts of the
State of Utah of all jurisdiction

H>

over his person.

Appendix page A-l

The fact that the State of Utah furnished

support

to the children of the defendant would certainly show that
the defendant and his family have had contact and dealings with
the State of Utah which would give the State of Utah jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the fact that the defendant resides
on the reservation does not, as a matter of law, deprive it of
jurisdiction of his person.
Since these were the only two matters submitted to
the Court as grounds for the motion, the Court is duty bound
to deny the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, and does so by
this document.
DATED this

/ 3

day of June, 1984.

"EOTD" BUNNELL, DISTRICT"'JUDGE
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